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I. Introduction
For the last word in procrastination, go travel with a river
reluctant to lose his freedom in the sea.1
The Colorado River rambles approximately 1,400 miles from its headwaters
in the Colorado Rocky Mountains to Mexico, providing water to forty million

* J.D./M.A. Environment and Natural Resources Candidate 2019. I would like to thank
Professor Jason Robison for his mentorship and for inspiring my interest in water law. Thanks also
to Catherine Di Santo Rust, Kaylee Harmon, Emily Madden, David Roberts, and Allison Strube
Learned for their thoughtful contributions to this Comment.
1

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 150–51 (Oxford U. Press ed., 1949).
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people along its course.2 Its journey ends where the river meets the sea in Mexico—
or, at least, it once did.3 In the last fifty years, the Colorado River has rarely
reached its terminus in the Gulf of California.4 The two-million-acre Colorado
River Delta once consisted of riparian and tidal wetlands that supported diverse
plant, bird, and marine life, which Also Leopold once famously described as
comprising “a hundred green lagoons.”5 Today, upstream demands for water have
reduced the river to only 1% of its pre-development flows at the delta, which
now forms a salted mudflat across its historical acreage.6 At one-tenth of the size
that Leopold once observed it, the delta now struggles to support the hundreds
of thousands of birds and various endangered species that still depend on its
shrunken wetlands.7
This Comment explores the historical, environmental, and legal contexts
that gave rise to Minute 323, the latest international effort to bring life back to
the delta.8 Adopted in September 2017, Minute 323 enters commitments from
the United States, Mexico, and a binational, non-governmental partnership,
to provide flows and funding to the delta over the next decade.9 Part II of this
Comment briefly considers the existing legal framework for international relations on the river.10 Part III evaluates the Minute’s environmental flows
program.11 This Comment offers a critical analysis of the program in Part IV,

Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado River Basin, in Waters and Water Rights 6 (R. Beck,
ed., 2005).
2

See Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis: Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado
River Delta, 1940–1975 xvii–xxx (U. Ariz. Press, ed., 2003).
3

4
IBWC, Sonoran Institute, Colorado River Limitrophe and Delta Environmental
Flows Monitoring Interim Report 18 (2016) [hereinafter IBWC Interim Report].
5

Leopold, supra note 1, at 150.

Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado
River Delta, 40 Nat. Resources J. 819, 819 (2000).
6

Nat. Res. Law Ctr., Univ. Colo. L. Sch., Rethinking the Future of the Colorado
River: Draft Interim Report of the Colorado River Governance Initiative 3 n.4 (2010). In
addition to the environmental devastation caused by the overconsumption of river resources, it is
also necessary to acknowledge the impacts of shortages on certain human populations in the delta
region. See Anita Alvarez Williams, People and the River, 39 J. Sw. 331 (1997). In particular, the
Cocopah (also Cucapá), have historically depended upon delta waters and have faced hardship
from delta shortages. Id. Understanding that the law of the river is subject to a complex history and
hardened criticisms with respect to indigenous populations, and that a responsible analysis of that
history deserves more space than this Comment can offer, this Comment focuses solely upon efforts
to restore the natural riparian environment of the Colorado River Delta.
7

8
IBWC, Minute No. 323, Extension of Cooperative Measures and Adoption of a
Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan in the Colorado River Basin (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min323.pdf [hereinafter Minute 323].
9

Id.

10

See infra notes 15– 82 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 83 –104 and accompanying text
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describing its failure to contrive an equitable or lasting solution between the
countries.12 Finally, Part V identifies a need for permanent change in the delta
that extends beyond the transient and modest obligations imposed by Minute
323.13 Ultimately, while Minute 323 deserves recognition as the most substantial effort to date toward achieving delta restoration, the Minute also
illuminates both substantive and procedural defects underlying the existing
process toward restoration.14

II. Legal and Historical Background
The Colorado River is the subject of an international legal overlay dating
back to World War II.15 In the decades of development and growth since
the nation’s first formalized relations on the river, demands on its resources
have increased exponentially, prompting the need to adapt the Treaty to
current contexts.16 The following section briefly synthesizes major episodes of
international cooperation on the river, highlighting several monumental, but
ultimately short-lived, attempts to send water back to the sea.

A. U.S.-Mexico Treaty of 1944
The United States and Mexico formalized their respective obligations and
rights with regard to the Colorado River in 1944, when the two nations signed a
treaty on the “Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande” (Treaty).17 The Treaty followed decades of dispute over the
river’s future in the wake of planned development.18 A push from stakeholders,
aimed to dissipate their anxieties over the security of massive anticipated water
infrastructure projects, ultimately led to the Treaty’s inception.19 Mexico, in
particular, had good reason to urge a negotiation of the Treaty, in the shadows of
the many American dams and diversions that would be authorized over the next
decades.20 Moreover, Mexico feared that the western American doctrine of prior
12

See infra notes 105 – 61 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 162–211 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 105– 61 and accompanying text.

Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219,
T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Treaty].
15

16

See infra notes 51–110 and accompanying text.

17

U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 15.

See Allie A. Umoff, An Analysis of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and
Future, 32 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 69, 72 (Fall 2008).
18

19

Id.

Prevailing mementos of pro-development sentiments during this period include Hoover
Dam (authorized in 1928), Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge dams (both authorized in 1956), and
the Central Arizona Project (authorized in 1968). See 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617v (2012); 43 U.S.C
§§ 620–620o (2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 (2012).
20
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appropriation would incentivize and enable water users to exhaust water supplies,
thereby depleting the amount of water that Mexico had historically received
downstream.21 Compounding further the likely realization of Mexico’s fears, the
United States espoused in the late-eighteenth century a doctrine that a nation has
absolute sovereignty over the water within its territory, permitting nations to act
without regard for neighboring riparian nations.22 Absent a treaty, the likelihood
of contriving an equitable and sustainable water-sharing arrangement between the
nations was improbable.23
By establishing an allocational and administrative framework for equitable
sharing of Colorado River water, the Treaty in 1944 purported to settle the
foregoing uncertainties over ownership of the river’s flows, as well as generate a
plan for the construction of infrastructure to facilitate those flows.24 Article 10
of the Treaty addresses specific allocations of Colorado River water.25 Specifically,
Article 10 guarantees to Mexico an annual quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet.26 In
the event that the United States determines that a surplus exists in a given year,
Mexico shall receive an additional quantity not in excess of 200,000 acre-feet.27
Article 10 also contains a provision for proportionate sharing of consumptive
use reductions between the two nations in the event that “extraordinary drought
or serious accident to the irrigation system in the United States” renders it
“difficult for the United States to deliver the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000

See Umoff, supra note 18, at 71–73. The doctrine of prior appropriation provides that a
user of water establishes a quantified water right for herself simply by diverting a quantity of water
to a beneficial and consumptive use. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment,
18 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 228, 242 (2015). Because the doctrine requires that water actually be
diverted from the water source and consumed to establish a right, it disfavors environmental uses, or
“flows,” which remain instream for the maintenance and protection of ecosystems. Id. at 278–80.
Further, the doctrine affords priority to senior water users (usually agricultural users with the oldest
claims), meaning that holders of senior water rights are entitled to their full water right before junior
users may receive any water. Id. Many western states have codified the common law doctrine of
prior appropriation. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-101 (2018) (“A water right is a right to use
the water of the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of water . . . .
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water at all times . . . .”).
21

Id. The Harmon Doctrine originated in an opinion by then-United States Attorney General
Judson Harmon, who in 1895 espoused the theory that nations possess absolute sovereignty over
water within their territory. See 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 274 (1895). An application of this doctrine
would preclude any liability on behalf of the United States for draining a shared river entirely before
it could reach Mexico. Id. at 19. But see Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred
Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 Nat. Resources J. 549, 549 (1996) (alleging that the United
States never actually acknowledged the doctrine in practice).
22

23

Id.

24

See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 15.

25

Id. art. 10(a).

26

Id.

27

See id. art. 10(b).
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acre-feet. . . . ”28 However, the Treaty does not further clarify what circumstances
might constitute an “extraordinary drought,” “serious accident,” or what would
cause water to be “difficult . . . to deliver.”29 Thus, while the Treaty settles the
countries’ allocational arrangement, it leaves unresolved the meaning and
administration of these ambiguous yet operative terms.30 By allowing the United
States to unilaterally determine the existence of a drought under this provision,
Mexico may be denied equitable protections in the event of water scarcity.31
The Treaty also created the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC), a binational administrative body responsible for the interpretation
and execution of Treaty provisions.32 The IBWC consists of both American and
Mexican Sections.33 Article 24 of the Treaty grants rulemaking authority to the
IBWC Sections to carry out studies, construct works and projects, and negotiate
agreements pertaining to the river and its limitrophe parts.34 The IBWC records
its decisions in the form of “Minutes,” which each government then has the
option to ratify through a simple process.35 Since the passage of the Treaty, the
IBWC has recorded 324 Treaty Minutes.36

28

Id.

29

See id.

Id. The “extraordinary drought” clause is a potential source of immense conflict between
the United States and Mexico, though such controversy has yet to erupt in a legal setting. Jason
Robison, The Colorado River Revisited, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 475, 504 (2017). As explained by one
scholar, “[a]t least two longstanding issues thus plague Article 10(b). One concerns the spatial and
temporal characteristics for deeming a drought ‘extraordinary.’ The other is procedural: By whom,
and through what processes, is this determination to be made?” Id.
30

31

Id.

32

U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 15, art. 2.

Id. The Mexican counterpart to the IBWC, the Comisión Internacional de Límites y
Aguas, is commonly abbreviated as “CILA.” See generally Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas,
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (last visited Dec. 7, 2018), https://cila.sre.gob.mx/cilanorte/.
33

34

U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 15, art. 24.

Id. art. 25. The IBWC publishes Minutes in both English and Spanish. Id. The Minutes
must also be “signed by each Commissioner and attested by the Secretaries, and copies thereof
forwarded to each Government within three days after being signed.” Id. Excepting situations where
the specific approval of the two Governments is required by another provision of the Treaty, “if
one of the Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or disapproval of
a decision of the Commission within thirty days . . . the Minute in question and the decisions
which it contains shall be considered to be approved by that Government.” Id. The Commission
is charged with executing approved decisions; however the Commission has relied heavily on the
assistance of a private binational organization to carry out recent Minutes. See infra notes 59–83
and accompanying text. For more information on Commission proceedings and rules, see The
International Boundary and Water Commission - Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for Solution
of Boundary and Water Problems, IBWC, https://www.ibwc.gov/About_Us/About_Us.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2018).
35

Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, IBWC, https://www.
ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2018).
36
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B. Environmental Considerations Within the U.S.-Mexico Treaty
International water law straddles the competing policy goals of promoting
the equitable allocation of transboundary waterways among riparian neigh
bors and maximizing the development of water resources within each state’s
borders.37 Historically, international water law has not promoted ecosystem-level
management, and the U.S.-Mexico Treaty proved no exception.38 The Treaty
evolved in an era that contemplated massive domestic water infrastructure
projects, while states entered into numerous interstate compacts that dedicated
massive funds and flows to states and their planned infrastructure.39 The synthesis
of these competing policies resulted in a “channel-based” legal regime that
prioritizes the delivery of flows, rather than holistic management of an entire river
system.40 The resulting scheme organizes the delivery of water for consumptive
uses, with little concern for how much water remains in the channel following
the fulfillment of delivery obligations.41 The Morelos Dam, which diverts the
United States’ flow obligation to the Mexicali Valley for agricultural irrigation,
is a perfect example of this traditional dam-and-divert regime.42 In classic form,
the Treaty arrangement also lacks any kind of comprehensive environmental
management plan.43
Similar to the doctrine of prior appropriation—which affords preference to
certain types of water usage over others in times of shortage—the Treaty delists
how international waters should be allocated in the event the IBWC must make
provision of joint waters.44 The Treaty does not address environmental flows
for the Colorado River within its designation of preferred joint uses of water,
which otherwise express an order of priority for domestic and municipal uses,
agriculture, industry, navigation, hunting, and “other beneficial uses.”45 Beginning
in 2000, however, the IBWC has harnessed the Treaty minute system to facilitate

A. Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem
Integrity, 10 BYU J. Pub. Law 181, 199 (1996) [hereinafter Tarlock, International Water
Law] (“International water law is a channel-based legal regime, as opposed to a watershed or
ecosystem-based legal regime and this focus is inherently biased toward development and against
ecosystem protection.”).
37

38

See infra notes 39– 43 and accompanying text.

39

Id.

40

Tarlock, International Water Law, supra note 37, at 199.

41

Id.

See A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 369,
385, 389 (2009) [hereinafter Tarlock, Four Challenges]. See also Jonathan S. King et al., Getting to
the Right Side of the River: Lessons for Binational Cooperation on the Road to Minute 319, 18 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 36, 52–53 (2014).
42

43

Id.

44

U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 15, art. 3.

45

Id.
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environmental uses of water.46 Several remarkable minutes, the latest of which is
Minute 323, document the IBWC’s growing, but hesitant, commitment to the
Colorado River’s environmental health—and to that of the delta in particular.47

C. 2000: Minute 306
The IBWC recorded Minute 306 in 2000, which committed it to “establish
a framework for cooperation by the United States and Mexico through the
development of joint studies that include possible approaches to ensure use of
water for ecological purposes in this reach and formulation of recommendations
for cooperative projects, based on the principle of an equitable distribution of
resources.”48 In addition, the IBWC agreed in Minute 306 to define the habitat
needs of marine and wildlife species of concern to each country through a
binational task force.49 Ultimately, Minute 306 represented an important phase
of conservation research and planning, tabling for another minute the actual
implementation of any conservation projects.50

D. 2010: Minutes 316 and 317
The IBWC adopted Minutes 316 and 317 in 2010, each in contemplation
of specific opportunities to operationalize the cooperative framework proposed in
Minute 306.51 Minute 316 authorized the temporary conveyance of up to 10,000
acre-feet of water through the Santa Clara Wetland, located in the delta.52 The
46
See infra notes 47–104 and accompanying text. Article 25 of the Treaty affords the
IBWC authority to interpret the Treaty and make binding decisions. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra
note 15, art. 25. For a full discussion of how the IBWC has utilized its authority of “adaptive
Treaty interpretation,” see Robert J. McCarthy, Executive Authority, Adaptive Treaty Interpretation,
and the International Boundary and Water Commission, 14 U. Den. Water L. Rev 197 (2011);
William Stanger, The Colorado River Delta and Minute 319: A Transboundary Water Law Analysis,
37 Environs: Envtl. L. & Pol’y J., 73, 104 (2013).
47

See infra notes 48–104 and accompanying text.

IBWC, Minute No. 306, Conceptual Framework for United States-Mexico Studies
Future Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the
Limitrophe Section of the Colorado River and its Associated Delta 1 (2000), http://www.
ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf [hereinafter Minute 306].
48

for

49

Id.

50

See id.

Chandler Clay, Bringing the River Back to the Sea, Envtl. Def. Fund, http://www.edf.
org/sites/default/files/pulseflow/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2018).
51

52
IBWC, Minute No. 316, Utilization of the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain and
Necessary Infrastructure in the United States for the Conveyance of Water by Mexico
and Non-Governmental Organizations of Both Countries to the Santa Clara Wetland
During the Yuma Desalting Plant Pilot Run 2 (2010), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/
Minute_316_w_JR.pdf [hereinafter Minute 316]. The Santa Clara Wetland (or the Cienega
de Santa Clara) is located in Sonora, Mexico, within the Colorado River Delta. Yamilett K.
Carrillo-Guerrero et al., From Accident to Management: The Cienega de Santa Clara Ecosystem, 59
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United States, Mexico, several environmental organizations from both countries,
and a number of American water agencies, furnished flows for the agreement.53
Participating entities also pledged approximately $350,000 USD for general
monitoring and canal repairs.54 Instead of creating lasting effects in the delta
region, Minute 316 facilitated the monitoring and inventory of opportunities
for active management of the delta wetlands in the future.55 Minute 317
expanded on the planning effects of Minute 316, requiring the IBWC to
explore the potential for binational conservation projects.56 The greatest impact
of Minutes 316 and 317 was to orient the United States and Mexico toward
increased collaborative capacity for an eventual environmental flows program.57
Even the temporary allocation of flows through the Wetland marked the IBWC’s
first attempt to bring back the delta ecosystem.58

E. 2012–2017: Minute 319
In 2012, the IBWC met in Coronado, California, and recorded Minute 319,
which contained substantive measures for ecological protections in the delta.59 In
the creation of Minute 319, “[t]he Commissioners referred to Minute 306, which
provided a conceptual framework for United States–Mexico studies related to
the riparian and estuarine ecology of the Colorado River limitrophe and delta.”60
Ecological Engineering 84, 85– 86 (2013). Beginning in the late 1970s, diversions of brackish
water from Arizona agricultural fields inundated the then-dormant Santa Clara Wetland, resulting
in the inadvertent reinvigoration of the ecosystem. Adriana Zuniga-Teran et al., Resilience in an
Uncertain Future: Part 1, Int’l Water Security Network (2016), http://www.watersecuritynetwork.
org/resilience-in-an-uncertain-future/. The wetland now provides habitat for protected species,
including the Desert Pupfish and Yuma Clapper Rail, as well as thousands of migratory waterbirds.
Guerrero et al., supra, at 86.
53
Stanger, supra note 46, at 90. Participating American agencies included the Metropolitan
Water District, the Central Arizona Water Conservation District, and the Southern Nevada Water
Authority. Id. It is unclear why these water agencies have not undertaken further participation in
procuring flows for Delta wetlands. Id.
54

See id.

55

Minute 316, supra note 52.

IBWC, Minute No. 317, Conceptual Framework for U.S. Mexico Discussions on
Colorado River Cooperative Actions (2010), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_317.
pdf [hereinafter Minute 317].
56

See id.; Edward P. Glenna et al., Restoration Potential of the Aquatic Ecosystems of the Colorado
River Delta, Mexico: Introduction to Special Issue on “Wetlands of the Colorado River Delta,” 59
Ecological Engineering 1, 3 (2013).
57

58

Id.

59

Id.

IBWC, Minute No. 319, Interim International Cooperative Measures in the
Colorado River Basin Through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318 Cooperative Measures
to Address the Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley,
Baja California 11–12 (2012), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf [hereinafter
Minute 319].
60
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The Minute noted, “to the extent additional water supplies can be identified, it
is desirable to have water for environmental purposes flow to the Colorado River
limitrophe and delta ecosystem.”61 Upon the recommendations of the Minute
306 task force, Minute 319 introduced a pilot environmental flows program to
expire with the Minute on December 31, 2017.62
Binational collaboration, bolstered by the heavy advocacy by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from both countries, was a necessary force
in negotiating commitments to delta flows.63 Minutes 306, 316, and 317 each
involved some level of non-governmental collaboration, which increased under
Minute 319.64 Preceding minutes established a Binational Environmental Work
Group composed of representatives from both governments, NGOs, and water
users, who together researched and proposed the substantive recommendations for
an environmental flows program.65 A separate Binational Coalition of NGOs also
helped facilitate negotiations and implement the flows program, chartered toward
goals of benefitting multiple restoration areas along the delta that Binational
Coalition members already actively managed.66
Flows under the Minute 319 pilot program consisted of both base flows
(small periodic releases of water) and pulse flows (large releases of water simulating
natural flooding) to emulate, on a small scale, the pre-development conditions of
the river.67 During the term of Minute 319, the Binational Coalition provided
base flows in the amount of 52,696 acre-feet for delivery to two river restoration
areas from Morelos Dam, located at the international border.68 The United
States and Mexico provided water for an additional pulse flow in the amount of
105,392 acre-feet.69 On January 31, 2014, United States Secretary of the Interior
Sally Jewell and Mexican Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Juan José Guerra Abud announced the release of the pulse flow from Morelos
Dam, simulating the natural springtime flooding that invigorated the river for
millennia.70 The IBWC delivered water over an eight-week period, beginning on

61

Id.

62

Id at 18.

Phone Interview with Jennifer Pitt, United States Co-Chair of Binational Coalition (Apr.
30, 2018).
63

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

IBWC Interim Report, supra note 4, at 10.

68

Minute 319, supra note 60, at 14.

69

Id.

See Our Work, Raise the River (Apr. 1, 2018), https://raisetheriver.org/our-work/ [herein
after Raise the River].
70
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March 23, 2014, and ending on May 18, 2014.71 On May 14, 2014 —for the
first time since 1997—the Colorado River flowed into the Gulf of California.72
Those involved with implementing the environmental flows program of
Minute 319 approached the pulse flow release with hesitant optimism, uncertain
whether the flow would simply disintegrate into the sand and mudflats, or
reach all the way to the sea.73 In achieving the latter, the pulse flow inundated
approximately 4,000 acres of the main channel, mobilized sedimentary deposits,
and recharged regional aquifers to a maximum extent of nine meters.74 One
goal of the pulse flow was to restore riparian vegetation, accomplished by timing
the pulse flow with natural seeding cycles.75 While the flow had no discernible
effect on fish or fauna, the abundance and diversity of migratory waterbirds
increased drastically—up to 49% in some areas.76
Environmentalists’ joy at observing the success of the pulse flow matched
only the verve of community members throughout the delta region, including
children who had known the river only through anecdote, as well as older
residents who could remember a time when the delta’s waters fortified community
livelihood.77 Among these observers were members of the indigenous Cocopah
community in particular, who rejoiced at the sight of water permeating the
delta’s mudflats.78
In the midst of celebrating the flow of delta waters once more, stakeholders
acknowledged that the effects of the pulse flow were only temporary.79 While
the pulse flow stimulated new growth of some riparian vegetation, the program
in its entirety emulated only 1% of the delta’s traditional base flow and natural
flooding.80 Even Minute 319’s unprecedented allocation of flows constituted only
an additional experiment in a long line of minutes designed to study the potential
for restoration, without effecting lasting restorative change.81 In recognition of its

71

IBWC Interim Report, supra note 4, at 10.

72

Id. at 16.

73

Clay, supra note 51.

74

IBWC Interim Report, supra note 4, at 18, 25, 34.

75

Id. at 10, 16.

76

Id. at 17.

77

Clay, supra note 51.

78

Id.

Id. (quoting a Mexicali Valley farmer, stating “[t]he pulse flow is a good idea, but it will
hardly restore a river that has spent years suffering from a lack of water”).
79

80

Id.

See King et al., supra note 42, at 106; David Owen, Where the Water Goes 218
(Riverhead Books, Penguin eds., 2017) (citing conversation with Hinojosa Huerta (Water and
Wetlands Program Director, Pronatura, Noroeste) and noting “[t]he pulse flow didn’t last very
81
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own limitations, Minute 319 called for the formation of a successor minute to
carry on the mission of the pilot program, though stopping short of recommending
a permanent framework for delta flows.82

III. 2017−2026: Minute 323
A. Minute Goals
On September 21, 2017, the IBWC met in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and
recorded Minute 323.83 This Minute contains sturdier and more permanent
provisions for environmental flows, which Minute 319 merely contemplated.84
Minute 323 took effect upon its signing, preempting Minute 319’s sunset date of
December 31, 2017.85 Among its many other provisions, Minute 323 registered
the commitment of the United States, Mexico, and the Binational Coalition to
deliver limited flows for the express benefit of the delta from 2017 to 2026.86 In
creating Minute 323, the IBWC:
referred to the results achieved in the Minute 319 pilot
program for water for the environment, including enhancing
the ecosystem’s vegetation and wildlife, generating social and
recreational benefits, improving conditions in the estuary, and
recharging the aquifer. They also reflected on how to maintain
the benefits of the pilot program while continuing joint
cooperative efforts to provide water for the environment.87
Citing these hefty aspirations, Minute 323 has been widely commended
as an example of successful international collaboration for environmental improvement.88

long. . . much of the new plant growth that occurred immediately following it had died. . . [but]
some existing vegetation had been given a boost by it. Nevertheless, many of the big plants we saw
near the river were [invasive species]”).
82

Minute 319, supra note 60, at 17–18.

83

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 1.

84

See id.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 15–16.

87

Id.

See, e.g., Minute 323: A U.S.-Mexico Agreement on Water that Benefits All, Nature
C onservancy , https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-we-work/priority-landscapes/
colorado-river/minute-323/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2018); Stephanie Sklar, Doubling Our Efforts in
Delta Thanks to Minute 323, Sonoran Institute: News (Oct. 7, 2017), https://sonoraninstitute.
org/2017/m323/.
88
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B. Minute Terms
Minute 323 expanded on the successes of Minute 319 by dedicating more
substantial flows to the delta over a considerably longer period of time.89 The
Binational Coalition again played an instrumental role in negotiating and
procuring flows for the program.90 Minute 323 sets forth the following program for environmental flows, with obligations for funding and water to be split
evenly among the United States, Mexico, and the Binational Coalition:




210,000 acre-feet of water for environmental purposes
within Mexico over the nine-year duration of the Minute;
$9 million USD of funding for scientific research and
monitoring; and
$9 million USD of funding for restoration projects.91

Although the Minute seemingly purports to split flows and funding obliga
tions jointly among the three participating entities, the United States’ flows
commitment technically derives from Mexico’s share of water.92 Under Minute
323, the United States will invest $31.5 million USD of additional funding for
the improvement and development of Mexican conservation projects, including
canal lining, on-farm conservation, reservoir regulation, fallowing, technical
operation of irrigation districts, system operations, and wastewater effluent
reuse systems.93 The Minute’s negotiators expect the conservation projects to
conserve significant quantities of water in an amount sufficient to satisfy the
Minute 323 environmental flows obligations of both the United States and
Mexico.94 For its part, the Binational Coalition collaboratively raised its share of
funds and secured flows in the amount of 70,000 acre-feet, although it expects to
far exceed this obligation before 2026.95 The Minute also contemplates that the

89

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 1.

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63. NGOs, including Pronatura Noroeste, The
Sonoran Institute, The Redford Center, The Audubon Society, and The Nature Conservancy
comprise the Binational Coalition. Id.
90

91

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 16.

92

See id. at 18.

93

Id.

Id. Under Minute 323, with reference to those waters generated or conserved from the
United States’ investments in Mexican conservation projects, “[a]ll of the waters generated or
conserved . . . will be allocated to Mexico except for the following volumes: 70,000 acre-feet (86
mcm) of water to satisfy the U.S. commitment noted in Section VIII . . . to provide water for the
environment, especially the Colorado River Limitrophe and Delta . . . .” Id. at 18.
94

95

Raise the River, supra note 70.
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Binational Coalition will raise $1 million toward a project of wastewater effluent
reuse in partial fulfillment of its water delivery obligations.96
Timing of the Minute’s delivery obligations differs slightly among the partici
pating entities.97 The Minute expects parties to fulfill their funding and flow
commitments within three years of the Minute’s effective date.98 The United States
receives an exception, however, and is not required to fulfill its flow commitment
within the three-year period.99 Rather, the Minute provides that the United States’
share of 70,000 acre-feet of water must be provided within the first five years of
the Minute’s adoption.100
Minute 323 does not specifically designate base or pulse flows, in contrast
to Minute 319.101 It is unclear to what type of flow or upon what schedule the
IBWC will allocate the cumulative 210,000 acre-feet of water.102 However, the
Binational Coalition suggests that water provided under the terms of Minute
323 will benefit existing restoration areas, as well as expand restoration efforts
to wetlands beyond the delta’s main channel.103 In Minute 323 the IBWC does
not expressly contemplate a successor Minute; that is, although Minute 323 will
expire in 2026, the Minute does not create an obligation for the IBWC to supplant
the substantive provisions of Minute 323 with any kind of similar program in
the future.104

IV. Analysis and Critique of Minute 323’s Delta Flows Program
Even as the benefits of Minute 323 continue to unfold, it already boasts notable
victories for the delta.105 Minute 323 currently represents the most robust effort
ever undertaken to promote restoration of the delta in terms of dedicated flows
and funding.106 The Minute also emerged as an example of binational cooperation
96

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 18–19.

97

See id. at 16.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Minute 319, supra note 60, at 17–18.

102

Id.

103

Raise the River, supra note 70.

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 18 –19. Comparatively, Minute 319 noted “the intention
of the Governments of the United States and Mexico to seek agreement on the development of
additional bilateral collaborative projects.” Minute 319, supra note 60, at 17–18. This would be
achieved through the negotiation of an additional minute between 2013 and 2017. Id. Such a
minute would have “the same implementation horizon until 2026 that has been indicated for a
comprehensive Minute that would extend or replace the substantive provisions of this Minute.” Id.
104

105

See Raise the River, supra note 70.

106

Id.
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at a time when the United States and Mexico have otherwise been unable to find
common ground on sundry policy matters.107 At the same time, the Minute’s
modest flow and funding provisions, its temporary duration, and its failure to
impose commensurate flow obligations on each sovereign together diminish the
Minute’s effectiveness.108 The following analysis suggests several imperatives for
a future environmental flows program, emphasizing the need for a more aggressive flows regime and for increased equity between the participating parties.109
The environmental flows program for the delta, as it currently stands under
Minute 323, fails to institute transformative change, instead reflecting a persisting
reluctance to commit to permanent, substantial, and equitable reservations to the
delta ecosystem.110

A. Funding and Flows Recommendations Not Adopted
The most significant shortcoming of Minute 323 is its failure to provide
funding or flows sufficient to restore a larger portion of the delta.111 While the
Binational Coalition and its partners have accurately praised Minute 323 as
an unprecedented commitment of environmental flows and funding toward
restoration of the delta,112 the Minute’s actual commitments are weak in
comparison to the terms that the technical Binational Environmental Work
Group (Work Group) recommended.113 Prior to the enactment of Minute 323,
the Work Group prepared a proposal recommending quantities of water and
funding adequate for the restoration of over 3,000 additional acres of the delta—a
modest goal in comparison to the delta’s historical reach.114 As stated in preface to
the environmental flows provisions of Minute 323:
[T]he Binational Environmental Work Group has analyzed
environmental benefits that could be generated under this
Minute and, after considering various amounts of environmental
water, recommended as a target an average annual volume of
107
See, e.g., Tom McCarthy, Trump’s Border Wall: US Military Is as Unlikely to Pay for It as Mexico,
Guardian (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/30/trump-borderwall-military-budget; Tracy Wilkinson & Brian Bennett, Trump Has First Meeting with Mexico’s Peña
Nieto Amid Tense Relations, LA Times (July 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/
la-na-essential-washington-updates-trump-has-1st-meeting-with-mexico-s-1499425322htmlstory.html.
108

See infra notes 111– 60 and accompanying text.

109

Id.

110

See infra notes 116– 49.

For a comparison of flows and funding recommended versus those adopted, see IBWC
Interim Report, supra note 4.
111

See, e.g., Lynn Bairstowe, Collaboration for the Colorado River Delta, Raise the River (Sept.
27, 2018), https://raisetheriver.org/collaboration-colorado-river-delta-2/.
112

113

See Minute 323, supra note 8, at 15–16.

114

Id.
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45,000 acre-feet (55 mcm) and restoration funding of up to $40
million dollars over the term of the Minute would be desirable to
maintain existing environmental restoration sites and to benefit
other sites in the Colorado River Delta riparian corridor and
estuary. The group has also identified opportunities to expand
the existing 1,076 acres (435 hectares) of restored native habitat
to 4,300 acres (1,700 hectares).115
The actual funding and flow provisions of Minute 323 fall drastically short,
amounting to about half of the levels recommended by the Binational
Environmental Work Group.116 Under the terms of Minute 323, the funding
dedicated to research, monitoring, and restoration totals only $18 million over
the course of nine years, less than half of that which the Work Group
recommended.117 Actual dedicated flows fared similarly, measuring slightly over
23,000 acre-feet of water per annum over the nine-year term.118
According to the Binational Coalition’s co-chair for the United States, Jennifer
Pitt, the IBWC did not commit to the funding and flow levels that the Work
Group proposed due to the unavailability of water in that amount.119 The IBWC
reduced funding to match the proportion of water available.120 In fulfillment of
its Minute 323 obligations, the Binational Coalition has purchased water rights
from the Mexicali Valley for reallocation to the delta.121 In fact, the Binational
Coalition expects to far exceed its Minute 323 commitments.122 Conversely, the
United States and Mexico have each dedicated flows to the Delta that do not yet
exist, as they will result only from pending conservation projects operationalized
under Minute 323.123
By adopting even a modest quantity of environmental flows, if not in the
full amount recommended by the Work Group, Minute 323 represents at the
very least a modicum of progress against the paucity of water in the delta.124
The success of the Binational Coalition is also an impressive example of
productive and committed collaboration among international stakeholders.125
115

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 16.

116

See id. at 16 –17.

117

See id.

118

Id.

119

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63.

120

Id.

121

Raise the River, supra note 70.

122

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63.

123

See Minute 323, supra note 8, at 18–19.

124

Bairstowe, supra note 112.

125

See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Yet, the disparity between the recommended and adopted conservation regimes
indicates the need to procure more substantial commitments to the delta from
the two sovereigns.126

B. Policy Obstacles to an Effective Flows Program
1. Reluctant Sovereigns
Neither Mexico nor the United States has historically prioritized delta
conservation or restoration, which is now clearly evidenced by the area’s
desiccation.127 The collaborative process undertaken over the course of Minutes
306, 316, 317, 318, 319, and 323 would not have been possible absent the
pains and toils of the Binational Coalition, which took on a facilitating role for
conservation where the governments failed to act.128 As Pitt notes, the inability
to procure sufficient flows and funds for the delta is symptomatic of the reluctance of either Mexico or the United States to take responsibility for the delta.129
While Mexico points to the United States as the upstream source of flow scarcity
causing dryness in the delta, the United States has made clear its disinterest in
mitigating environmental degradation of the river, the effects of which are most
strongly visible in Mexico.130
The unwillingness of either Mexico or the United States to acknowledge its
liability for the delta’s decline poses a formidable policy obstacle.131 Although both
countries have come together in collaboration over various minutes, the relatively
inadequate level of flows committed to the delta, as compared to the recommended
levels, reflects the countries’ residual hesitancy.132 This hesitancy has created space
for the Binational Coalition to step into the role of conserva-tion mediator and
caretaker for delta resources.133 Traditionally, only states have rights or obligations
under public international law, providing few answers regarding the Binational
Coalition’s liability and legal duties in fulfillment of its commitments.134 The

126

See infra notes 130 – 61 and accompanying text.

127

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63.

Id. According to Pitt, “[t]he NGOs started talking about restoring the Colorado River
and its delta in the late 90’s and it took many years of advocacy and many different attempts to get
committed flows in the Delta. Id. (“There was litigation from Defenders [of Wildlife], there were all
sorts of attempts for them to get surplus defined for the Delta. Many different approaches did not
work over the years. Big picture, neither country was taking responsibility for the Delta.”).
128

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

See generally Minute 323, supra note 8.

134

Stanger, supra note 46, at 93.
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Binational Coalition credits its more ample involvement in restoration to having
fewer political and legal obstacles to navigate than the governments, allowing it
to seek out private donors, for instance.135 At the same time, the participation of
a private coalition does not excuse the governments’ failure to proactively pursue
adequate conservation solutions.136
Although the Binational Coalition believes its role in the delta can and should
expand in the future, its water marketing approach involving the purchase of
private water rights will become less sustainable as climate change diminishes
remaining flexible water sources.137 Scientists project that climate change
will reduce Colorado River’s flows by over nine percent by 2060, under conservative estimates.138 The intensely agricultural Mexicali Valley, from which the
Coalition purchased water rights to fulfill their Minute 323 obligations, already
experiences shortages and declining water tables.139 As the region’s water becomes
increasingly unaffordable under the influences of climate change and regional
growth, the Coalition may be unable to match the demands of the delta.140 This
is particularly likely absent a joint commitment from the United States and
Mexico to fairly contribute water and funding in the future.141

135

Id.

For one articulation of the international mandate against actions which harm the
environment of a downstream riparian, see United Nations, Stockholm Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/Rev. 1, at 3 (1973). In
particular, the Stockholm Convention provides authority for the principle that states are responsible
for the cross-boundary effects of their water usage. Id. (stating that under the Charter of the United
Nations and principles of international water law, states are entitled to “exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies,” while at the same time being charged with “the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of States or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction”). For a deeper
discussion regarding the theoretical and legal obligations of sovereigns under international water
law, see Tarlock, International Water Law, supra note 37.
136

See, e.g., Lance Gunderson & Barbara Cosens, Case Studies in Adaptation and Trans
formation of Ecosystems, Legal Systems, and Governance Systems, in Practical Panarchy for Adaptive
Water Governance 24 (eds. Lance Gunderson & Barbara Cosens eds., 2018); Eloise Kendy et al.,
Water Transactions for Streamflow Restoration, Water Supply Reliability, and Rural Economic Vitality in
the Western United States, 54 J. Am. Water Resources Ass’n 487, 487 (2018).
137

138
Mark Squillace, Water Transfers for A Changing Climate, 53 Nat. Resources J. 55,
57 (2013).
139
Senador Marco Antonio Blásquez Salinas, Proposiciones, Gaceta del Senado [SenateGazette] (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=75489.
140
O.W. Bussey, Leave Some for the Fishes: Water for the Environment in the U.S.–Mexico
Agreement on the Colorado River, Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. (2018), https://gelr.org/2018/03/16/leavesome-for-the-fishes-water-for-the-environment-in-the-us-mexico-agreement-on-the-colorado-river/.
141

See infra notes 169– 86 and accompanying text.
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2. Principles of Equity
Critics have also disparaged Minute 323 for failing to contrive an equitable
agreement between the two countries, even as private organizations step in to
remediate the resource shortcomings.142 Equity and fairness are important not
only to maintain the collaborative capacity between the United States and
Mexico for the future, but also because they are guiding principles of international
water law.143 Experts generally agree that “each riparian state is entitled to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of an international water
resource . . . [the principle] balance[es] the possible detrimental consequences of
an upstream nation’s use of a shared resource against the beneficial results of the
use.”144 This principle enjoins upstream nations from unilaterally consuming or
damming a shared river to the detriment of downstream riparians.145
The U.S.-Mexico Treaty itself has long been the subject of criticism for
allocating a disproportionately large share of flows to the United States, as
well as affording the United States extraordinary discretion in determining
its drought obligations to Mexico.146 Minute 323 similarly fails to mandate
equitable commitments between the United States and Mexico in terms of the
water resources each country must supply.147 As previously noted, the United
States will invest $31.5 million USD in Mexican water infrastructure under the
Minute’s terms to fund improvements and modernizations for canal and farm
infrastructure.148 The United States will receive credit for water generated through
these conservation projects to satisfy its expected contribution of 70,000 acre-feet
for the delta.149
Members of the Mexican public and government officials of the Mexicali
Valley have voiced resounding dissatisfaction with this arrangement, alleging it
effectively permits the United States to purchase water from Mexico in violation

142

Id.

Melissa Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable Principles
to Determine Water Allocation from the Rio Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9 Geo. Int’l
Envtl. L. Rev. 489, 499 (1997).
143

Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Resources, and the
Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 67, 72–84
(1995). For a comprehensive summary of the history of equity in international water law, see
Tarlock, International Water Law, supra note 37.
144

145

Tarlock, Four Challenges, supra note 42, at 375.

146

Lopez, supra note 143, at 499.

147

Salinas, supra note 139.

148

Minute 323, supra note 8, at 16–18.

149

Id.
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of Article 10 of the Treaty.150 The Mexicali Valley, a critical agricultural hub for
Mexico and the United States, has experienced water shortages and droughts in
the last several years, with climate change and increasing demand projected to
worsen these conditions in the future.151 Although the investment arrangement
will promote conservation and augment Mexico’s available water, critics allege
that the exchange generates a dangerous precedent that allows the United States
to substitute money for water in fulfillment of its Treaty obligations to Mexico.152
As Mexican Senator Marco Antonio Blasquéz Salinas opined:
The sale is disguised as an ‘infrastructure replacement program . . . .’ The delivery of water by infrastructure, that is, the
sale of water, is a violation of the Water Treaty of 1944, because
it denatures the essence of the agreement that consists in the just
distribution of water . . . . The sale of water implies, of course, a
cut that deteriorates the precarious situation of the producers of
the Mexicali Valley.153
Though his view is not necessarily universal to Mexican policymakers and his
constituents, Senator Blasqúez Salinas reasonably interprets Minute 323 as
imbalanced.154 Given the backdrop of historically inequitable Treaty-related
conduct by the United States, Mexico may find justification in closely scruti-

150
See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. This criticism can be directed also to the
Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan under Minute 323, which permits Mexico to store
a portion of its Treaty allotment in Lake Mead. Minute 323, supra note 8, at 6–7. The measures
intend to safeguard against the proclamation of water shortage in relation to the elevation of Lake
Mead. Id. The plan also affords Mexico more flexibility in drawing from its Treaty allotment. Id.

Drought Monitor, U. Neb., Lincoln (Apr. 20, 2018), https://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/
nadm/Home/NADMByArea.aspx. The value of water to Mexicali agricultural producers cannot
be overstated. David Agren, Mexico Protesters Fear US-Owned Brewery Will Drain Their Land
Dry, Guardian (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/04/mexico-waterbrewery-mexicali-constellation-brands. Conagua, Mexico’s National Water Commission, declared
the Mexicali area’s aquifer overexploited and has prohibited the drilling of new wells. Id. Yet,
Constellation Brands, the third largest brewing company in the United States, recently sited a new
plant in the valley which residents fear will consume a large quantity of the area’s remaining water.
Id.; Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63. Thousands of Mexicali residents, organized under
the group “Mexicali Resists,” oppose the plan due to the existing shortage in the area and for the
implication that Mexican water rights are being appropriated to the benefit of American companies.
Agren, supra. Despite protests, Constellation Brands expect to begin operations at this location in
2019. Id.
151

For an example of widespread public criticism which frames Minute 323 as a water sale,
see Ariadna García, Is Mexico Selling Water to the U.S.?, El Universal (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.
eluniversal.com.mx/english/mexico-selling-water-us. This title has been translated into English
from its original publication in Spanish.
152

153
Salinas, supra note 139. This excerpt was translated from its original publication in Spanish
by the author.
154

For an elaborated discussion of this perspective, see García, supra note 152.
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nizing any perceived attempts by the United States to skirt its Treaty obligations.155
Such incidents include the Colorado River Salinity Crisis, for instance, which
manifested in the early 1960s.156 During that period, the United States denied
its obligation under the Treaty to deliver water to Mexico of high enough quality
to be put toward beneficial use.157 The crisis was ultimately resolved under
Minute 242, though some in Mexico still believe that the United States effectively
violated the Treaty with immunity for decades.158
In response to concerns that Minute 323 could aggravate underlying
inequities in the Treaty, the Binational Coalition has implied that maintaining
or achieving equitable apportionment was not an operative function of Minute
323.159 According to Pitt, “[t]he Minute is not based on a standard of equity in
that it is the output of two parties coming together and having a negotiation.”160
Pitt also noted that capable representatives negotiated on Mexico’s behalf, but
even perceived inequities in Minute 323 could jeopardize the political will of
Mexican policymakers to collaborate for environmental flows programs with the
United States in the future.161

V. Minute-by-Minute No More:
Call for Transformative Change in the Delta
Minute 323 represents the most recent development in a long line of
attempts to embolden the environmental restoration capacity of the Treaty.162
As noted, the Minute fails to establish a lasting environmental flow program,
rendering uncertain the future of the delta past 2026.163 The IBWC may
eventually renegotiate another, stronger flows program through a successor
minute.164 However, the flaws of Minute 323 are inherent to the Minute system

155

See Umoff, supra note 18, at 78– 81.

156

Id.

157

Id.

Id. The full history and outcome of the Colorado River Salinity Crisis is beyond the scope
of this Comment, though its context is informative for public and governmental perceptions of
American Treaty performance. For more information on the Colorado River Salinity Crisis and
Minute 242, see id.
158

159

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63.

160

Id.

161

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.

162

Stanger, supra note 46, at 74.

163

See Bussey, supra note 140.

Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63. The Binational Coalition has expressed its
willingness to continue negotiating flows for the delta on a periodic timeline, with plans to return
to negotiations in 2026 to arrange a successor program under an additional minute. Id.
164
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and the Treaty.165 For example, the Treaty itself still operates upon a gross overestimate of the river’s annual flows. 166 Although the ecological minutes have
provided much-needed life support to the delta, a more effective program may
call for the full innovation of existing assumptions and governance on the river.167
The following sections explore options for the creation of a permanent program,
as well as their challenges.168

A. Of Environment and Equity: Options for a Permanent Environmental
Flows Program
Like its predecessor flow programs, Minute 323 is not permanent and
will expire in 2026.169 The Binational Coalition has expressed its willingness
to continue negotiating flows for the delta on a periodic timeline, with plans
to return to negotiations in 2026 to arrange a successor program under an
additional minute.170 The federal governments are not required to accommodate
this plan, as the IBWC is under no legal obligation to adopt a successor minute
for environmental flows for the delta upon Minute 323’s expiration.171 Similarly,
the Binational Coalition participates under no discernible legal obligation to
continue furnishing resources or valuable on-the-ground services.172 Given the
considerable—albeit, insufficient—amount of funding and water invested in the
delta under the duration of Minute 319, and further dedicated under Minute
323, the IBWC has clear incentive to renegotiate in 2026 to avoid a loss of prior
investments.173 However, the terms of Minute 323 certainly do not guarantee
such action.174
One obvious, but ultimately indeterminate, option for the delta’s future
is to continue upon a trajectory of periodic minute negotiations, replicating the
pattern to-date of incremental growth toward a more mature flows program.175
This option is not ideal in light of criticisms already discussed, primarily that
neither the United States nor Mexico are under obligation to continue providing
even a bottom line of flows.176 The delta faces competition for water from
165

See infra notes 170 –78 and accompanying text.

166

John Fleck, Water Is for Fighting Over 16–17 (Island Press ed., 2016).

167

See infra notes 168–210 and accompanying text.

168

Id.
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Minute 323, supra note 8.

170

Id.

171

Id.
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See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

173

See supra notes 59–104 and accompanying text.
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Minute 323, supra note 8.
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Interview with Jennifer Pitt, supra note 63.
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See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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intensifying municipal and industrial demands, and there is no guarantee that
negotiators will find water to spare in 2026.177
A second option would involve a permanent Minute with permanent
commitments, but also with flexible mechanisms to manage the delta adaptively.178
Treaty minutes are not normally permanent, though Minute 242 is exemplary
of the potential of the minute process to craft lasting solutions.179
A third, idealistic option would involve amending the Treaty to codify a
permanent environmental flow allocation deriving from Article 10 apportion
ments. This revision could timely prompt the amendment of Article 10 entirely,
coinciding with efforts in the United States to reform domestic water manage
ment to reflect more accurate estimates of the river’s annual flows.180 A permanent
environmental flows program under the second and third options would likely
operate similarly.181 While functionally identical, however, an amendment to the
Treaty would modernize the agreement to make it more serviceable to modern
values of environmental protection and social equity.182
Adopting a permanent environmental flows program for the delta—which
is at the same time adaptive in management—involves the pursuit of conflicting
policy goals.183 While the minute system is inherently transitory, it is also important
to avoid creating a permanent program that prescribes to the delta an overly
rigid flows regime that repeats the fallacies of the river’s present allocation.184 An

177

Bussey, supra note 140.

Tarlock, Four Challenges, supra note 42, at 404–08 (suggesting tools of integrated water
resource management and adaptive management to implement shared management of tran
boundary rivers).
178

179

See Umoff, supra note 18, at 78–81.

See Dan Elliott, The Plan to Save the Colorado River, Casper Star Trib. (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/the-plan-to-save-the-colorado-river/article_a7cc4d8e86e6-5f69-a847-47cba72ded81.html. An amendment, or even upheaval, of the Treaty may not
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the Treaty and other governing documents of the river grossly overestimated the river’s annual flows.
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Mead. See Luke Runyon, When in Drought: States Take on Urgent Negotiations to Avoid Colorado
River Crisis, Colo. Pub. Radio (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/14/656343127/
when-in-drought-states-take-on-urgent-negotiations-to-avoid-colorado-river-crisi.
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Olivia O. Green & Charles Perrings, Institutionalized Cooperation and Resilience, in SocialEcological Resilience and the Law 191 (Ahjond Garmestani & Craig R. Allen, eds., 2014).
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effective program would begin by creating a permanent governance framework in
which adaptive management could occur.185 Stated simply, adaptive management
operationalizes the idea that management strategies should reflect and respond
to new scientific information.186

B. Recommendations Toward a Permanent Adaptive Management Framework
Though drawing from the network of entities that launched Minute 323—
including the IBWC, a Binational Environmental Work Group with technical
expertise, and the Binational Coalition—a reformed program could better
utilize environmental expertise to establish binding, substantial, and permanent
environmental resolutions.187 A reinvented environmental flows program
should rectify traits of the water governance framework that contributed to the
weaknesses of Minute 323, while strengthening those components that made
it effective.
Among the strengths of the Minute 323 administrative framework is the
Binational Environmental Work Group, which was composed of water users,
NGOs, and government officials with technical expertise in water management.188
Along with the Binational Environmental Work Group employed in Minute
323, similar work groups participating in the other ecological minutes facilitated
collaborative binational decision-making and empowered stakeholders.189 A
new program should employ a permanent work group with a similar technical,
collaborative, and scientific capacity.190 Such an entity could assure through
monitoring, mandatory review periods, and sunset dates on each iteration of

divide water based on fixed volumes, the least adaptive form of allocation. Rigid entitlements leave
no flexibility to account for hydrologic variability, and the IPCC predicts such rigidity will lead to
increased international tension. . . .”).
185
Adaptive management, or adaptive law, can be described as management which is
“internally adaptive and resilient to a wide range of possible disturbances.” Craig Arnold & Lance
Gunderson, Adaptive Law, in Social-Ecological Resilience and the Law, supra note 184, at
318. “Adaptability” means “the capacity of actors in a system to manage resilience in the face of
uncertainty and surprise.” Carl Folke et al., Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem
Management, in Foundations of Ecosystem Mgmt. 140 (Lance Gunderson et al., eds., 2010).

A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1121, 1139 (1994).
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Minute 323, supra note 8; see also Barbara Cosens & Lance Gunderson, Adaptive Water
Governance: Summary and Synthesis, in Practical Panarchy for Adaptive Water Governance,
supra note 137, at 319 (“For government itself to be adaptive, it must have the legal authority to
respond to change. . . [and to] adjust water allocations and water quality requirements in response
to change.”).
188

See supra note 179 and accompanying text.

189

King et al., supra note 42, at 85.

190

Minute 323, supra note 8.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

23

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 1, Art. 4

254

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

an environmental program that the program is responsive to the ecology of the
delta, as well as other environmental concerns.191 Certainly, adaptive ecological
and policy solutions at the international scale should also be pursued in light of
domestic water challenges or policy innovations occurring in either country.192
One glaring weakness of Minute 323, as well as the other ecological minutes,
is that the Binational Environmental Work Group served a purely advisory role
unable to make binding recommendations to the IBWC, as exemplified in the
deficient flow and funding requirements that Minute 323 actually adopts.193
Rather than inhabiting a purely advisory role, a reformed program should afford
substantial deference to the recommendations of a technical and collaborative
work group.194 The reformed work group should possess the capacity to make
binding recommendations as to source, volume, type, and timing of environmental
flows, perhaps absorbing a delegation of authority to make these and related
environmental decisions from the IBWC.195
Moreover, a reformed program could take instruction from domestic adaptive
management programs that engage a diverse and more representative range of
stakeholder input. For example, the American conservation programs on the
river, including the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program,196
the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program,197 and the Lower
Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program,198 each incorporate input

191

See Tarlock, Four Challenges, supra note 42, at 407–08.

See Gary P. Kofinas, Adaptive Co-Management in Social -Ecological Governance, in Prin
Ecosystem Stewardship 89 (F. Stuart Chapin et al. eds., 2009) (describing solutions
for governance regimes “misfit” to the spatial and geographic scale of a resource and suggesting
multiscale co-management or broadened resource governance jurisdictions).
192

ciples of

193

See supra 111–26 and accompanying text.

See generally Roberto Sanchez, Public Participation and the IBWC: Challenges and Options,
33 Nat. Resources J. 283 (1993) (discussing limited technical expertise of the IBWC and calling
for broadened advisory input, including public participation).
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Id. (“The truth is that border problems, particularly water issues, have outgrown the
jurisdiction of the Commission. Their solution can no longer depend on the limited technical skill
of the IBWC engineers. Rather, they require an integrated and interdisciplinary approach.”).
196

The Path to Recovery in the Upper Colorado River Basin, Upper Colorado River Endan

gered Fish Recovery Program (2018), http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/

general-publications/path-to-recovery/Path-to-Recovery-webx.pdf (“The Bureau of Reclamation
adaptively manages Glen Canyon Dam releases to support the needs of humpback chub and address
issues associated with nonnative predators.”).
197
Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Oct. 23,
2018), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/.

Adaptive Management Program, Lower-Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation
Program (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/adapt_mgt.html.
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from between thirteen and fifty-seven discrete stakeholder groups.199 Among
those interests represented are federal and state agencies, numerous Indian tribes,
private and public water users, recreation groups, and NGOs.200 Incorporating
a wider range of stakeholder input would not only lend social legitimacy to the
work group’s recommendations, but would also augment the group’s available
base of knowledge.201
With respect to facilitating procedural and social equity, the governments
should continue to encourage equal American and Mexican participation, though
with the potential accompaniment of a full reform of the IBWC amenable to
a work group’s increased role.202 The Binational Coalition would also have a
vested interest in continuing its involvement, likely through a lessened or
modified role.203 The Binational Coalition has proven its value as a representative
of environmental interests among reluctant federal governments.204 While it
has exhibited its tremendous utility as a facilitator, implementer, and advocate
of these interests, a permanent arrangement must be accompanied by increased
governmental responsibility and accountability to the delta, which may
necessarily reduce the role that the Binational Coalition has historically filled.205
An administrative entity should also utilize input of the Cocopah Tribe and
other delta community stakeholders, who have not received due representation
during the negotiations of past environmental flow programs.206 The absence of

The Upper Colorado Fish Recovery Program involves thirteen stakeholders, consisting
primarily of states and government agencies. Program Partners, Upper Colo. River Endangered
Fish Recovery Program, http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/programpartners.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
incorporates the input of twenty-five stakeholders, including Indian tribes, states, conservation
groups, and government agencies in its adaptive management work group. Adaptive Management
Work Group Members, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/
amp/amwg/amwg_members.html. Finally, the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation
Program represents interests fifty-seven federal, state, municipal, private, and indigenous groups in
its Steering Committee. Steering Committee, Lower-Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation
Program (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.lcrmscp.gov/steer_committee/governance.html.
199

200
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a requirement for Cocopah input on the delta flows program is a major failure of
the entire Minute process to date.207
Finally, a program with these provisions must be anchored with an explicit
and permanent commitment from the two governments to prioritize delta
restoration, which equitably apportions responsibility and liability for the delta’s
future.208 A permanent flows management program could be facilitated under
the IBWC’s existing delegation of rulemaking authority, through a permanent
designation of environmental flows from the water resources currently allocated
to each nation.209 As discussed above, an amendment to Article 10 that allocates
flows for the delta, and perhaps other environmental ends, would constitute
a more permanent option.210 Both options would require ratification by the
federal governments.211

VI. Conclusion
The delta may never return to its former state.212 Growing population
and intensifying municipal and industrial demands on the river will further
exacerbate existing shortages.213 Absent a clear and continuing commitment by
the nations to furnish flows for the environment in the future, the delta hovers
in jeopardy.214 Although Treaty minutes enacted over the last twenty years have
memorialized a rejuvenated appreciation for the delta ecosystem, they have so
far failed to champion a lasting or binding program for its restoration.215 This
Comment has discussed the urgency for more transformative change, delineating
several possible avenues of action.216 The Treaty between the United States and
Mexico must be amended to reflect modern values of environmental protection
and equity, or, at the very least, a permanent Minute must be implemented for
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the long-term operationalization of these values.217 Of course, amending the
existing foundational documents governing the Colorado River, or to create new
ones, would present a daunting policy task for the governments, the Binational
Coalition, and additional stakeholders.218 This task is formidable, but increasingly
practical as the river’s overallocation becomes unfortunately apparent, and as the
prioritization of its riparian ecosystems becomes a more desperate cause.
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218
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